1. Economic systems and mechanisms of scarce resource allocation 2. New Welfare Economics, efficiency and welfare 3. Public goods and externalities as a rationale for a collective action 4. Individual and collective action, organizations, firms and the state 5. Information asymmetry, agency problem and corporate governance 6. Collective action and public choice, dictatorship and democracy 7. The choice of the voting rules, positive properties of majority voting 8. Normative properties of majority voting, rational ignorance and rational irrationality 9. Political parties' competition, logrolling and coalitions 10. Interest groups and rent-seeking 11. Theory of bureaucracy 12. Economics of regulation 13. Public choice and public finance
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The aim of the course is to explain the performance of the private and the public sector with respect to the problems of collective action. We will contrast the framework of individual choices of various economic agents having - in the sphere of collective choice - different incentives and interests and facing different formal and informal social institutions. Students will be introduced to economic analysis of factors influencing behaviour of politicians, voters, bureaucrats, and interest groups in the public sector, as well as shareholders and managers in the corporate sphere
Upon successful completion of this course, students will be able to: - identify problems occurring in collective decision-making; - apply economic models to explain the problems of collective choice; - make use of basic public choice concepts in discussion; - understand advantages and limits of economic approach in the analysis of social reality.
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Akerlof, G. A. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500..
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Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62(5), 777-795..
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Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (available online: http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1063/Buchanan_0102-03_EBk_v6.0.pdf).
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Buchanan, J. M. Positive economics, welfare economics, and political economy. Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 124-138..
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Butler, E. Public choice ? A primer. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. (available online: https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IEA%20Public%20Choice%20web%20complete%2029.1.12.pdf).
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Caplan, B. Rational ignorance versus rational irrationality..
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COASE, R. H. The Nature of the Firm. Economica, Vol. 4, No. 16 (1937).
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Mitchell, W. C., & Munger, M. C. Economic models of interest groups: An introductory survey. American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 512-546..
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Niskanen, W. A. Bureaucrats and politicians. The Journal of Law and Economics, 18(3), 617-643..
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Olson, M. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development..
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Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the.
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Rosen, H., & Gayer, T. Public Finance. McGraw-Hill Higher Education..
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Stiglitz, J. E., & Rosengard, J. K. Economics of the Public Sector. WW Norton & Company. (vybrané kapitoly).
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